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Executive Summary  
 
Key points 
 
▪  On safety: The Fukushima accident highlights the need for improved preparedness for events  
    beyond the design basis for nuclear reactors, strengthened emergency response, and safer  
    management of spent nuclear fuel.   The accident has had an impact on public and investor  
    confidence in nuclear energy, but nuclear power is likely to continue to grow in the most  
    important nuclear markets. 
▪  On RD&D: Major reductions in the cost of nuclear energy are not a major goal of current  
    RD&D programs. Rather, current RD&D programs are targeted on offering new capabilities  
    (such as high-temperature process heat) and improving features such as safety, waste   
    management, sustainability of fuel resources, and proliferation-resistance, while maintaining or  
    improving cost-competitiveness. 
▪  On Gen IV: Gen IV systems will probably not be cheaper than Gen III/III+ (or light water  
    reactor, LWR) designs.  Instead, their value would come from the generation of by-products  
    (i.e., hydrogen and process heat), the ability to extend uranium resources or minimize nuclear  
    wastes, or from improved safety and proliferation-resistance.  
▪  On small reactors: Small modular reactors (both LWR and Gen IV designs) may or may  
    not be cost competitive with large Gen III/III+ designs, but could have other benefits, such as  
    simpler financing, improved safety, or strengthened proliferation resistance.  There was  
    disagreement about their market potential. 
▪  On barriers to large-scale deployment: For nuclear to play a major role in meeting the energy  
    challenges of the 21st century, issues going well beyond RD&D need to be addressed, such as  
    public acceptance, waste management, and government support for licensing and financing. 
 
 
Dramatic growth in nuclear energy would be required for nuclear power to provide a 
significant part of the carbon-free energy the world is likely to need in the 21
st century, or 
a major part in meeting other energy challenges.  This would require increased support 
from governments, utilities, and publics around the world.  Achieving that support is 
likely to require improved economics and major progress toward resolving issues of 
nuclear safety, proliferation-resistance, and nuclear waste management.  This is likely to 
require both research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of improved 
technologies and new policy approaches.   
To gather information on the RD&D needs for the future of nuclear energy, the future 
cost and performance of nuclear technologies, and on the major barriers to large-scale 
deployment of nuclear energy, a team of researchers at Harvard University and the 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) conducted two coordinated surveys of nuclear 
experts.  The surveys asked experts how much they would recommend that their 
governments spend on nuclear energy RD&D; what progress in cost and performance 
might be expected by 2030 if those recommendations were followed; and what other 
factors might constrain or promote future nuclear energy growth.  Leading experts from 
the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (E.U.) participated in this expert 
elicitation surveys during the summer and fall of 2010.  In April 2011, the FEEM and 
Harvard teams held a workshop in Venice, Italy with a subset of the participating E.U. 
and U.S. experts to present and discuss the results of the elicitations, in an effort to   4
understand where there is consensus and where the most important disputes and 
uncertainties lie.  Given the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, the meeting opened 
with a discussion of the significance of that event for the future of nuclear power, and of 
the main lessons learned.   
The participating experts emphasized that the Fukushima accident was still unfolding, 
which made it difficult to understand its lessons in detail.  However, the experts agreed 
that the accident highlighted the need to strengthen preparation for events that go beyond 
the design basis for individual nuclear plants, to have better emergency response plans in 
place, and to improve approaches to managing spent nuclear fuel, in particular to prevent 
fuel from melting or catching fire if a spent fuel pool loses its cooling mechanism. 
In the elicitation survey (which took place before the accident), experts had already 
pointed to safety as one of the main issues that could set back the deployment of nuclear 
power, predicting that an accident or terrorist attack that led to a major release of 
radioactivity would result in 50-100% reductions in future construction of nuclear 
reactors in the United States and in the European Union.  The experts participating in the 
workshop disagreed as to whether the releases from Fukushima represented the kind of 
major radioactive release they had envisioned in making this prediction.  During the 
workshop, experts generally agreed that the accident would have different effects on 
nuclear construction in different countries, but would not be likely to greatly slow nuclear 
growth in China, India, and Russia, the largest current nuclear markets. 
A key finding that emerged in the survey and was confirmed during the workshop 
discussion is that experts do not expect current public RD&D investments to lead to 
major reductions in the capital cost of nuclear power plants by 2030, although cost-
competitiveness with other power generation technologies in the longer term is a goal of 
RD&D programs.  Current RD&D is also targeted on other objectives, such as new 
abilities to produce hydrogen and high-temperature process heat, extension of uranium 
resources, improved waste management, and improved nuclear safety and proliferation-
resistance. The reduction in the cost of Gen IV reactors in 2030 that the experts projected 
to arise from their recommended RD&D investments compared to a business-as-usual 
RD&D funding scenario was between 0-20%; the best guess of the cost of Gen IV 
reactors in 2030 ranges between 3,000 and 7,000 $/kW in both the United States and the 
European Union (similar to that of Gen III/III+ reactors, see Figure ES-1).  In addition, 
the workshop confirmed that under a business-as-usual and under an expanded nuclear 
RD&D funding scenario, over 50% of U.S. and E.U. experts thought that the cost of 
SMRs in 2030 would be greater than that of Gen III/III+ reactors.  Under an enhanced 
nuclear RD&D funding scenario, 53% of E.U. experts thought that Gen IV reactors could 
be less expensive than Gen III/III+ reactors in 2030, while the majority of U.S. experts 
still thought that Gen IV reactors would be more expensive.   
Experts from both sides of the Atlantic strongly agreed on the value of nuclear RD&D to 
achieve objectives other than cost reduction, and recommended annual RD&D funding 
between $1 billion and $2 billion in each geography (the U.S. budget in 2010 excluding 
funding for facilities was $411 million, the average EU budget in the period 2005-2009 
was $730 million).  Beyond financing RD&D and promoting solutions for long-term 
waste disposal, experts thought that governments should provide support for licensing   5
and siting novel reactor designs to help reduce the expected cost and the risks to the 
private sector.  
During the workshop, U.S. and E.U. experts disagreed on the market for small modular 
factory built reactors (SMRs).  While U.S. experts were split, E.U. experts did not foresee 
a large market.  Consequently, U.S. experts placed more emphasis on public funding for 
SMR RD&D.  Proponents of SMRs pointed to benefits that include: (a) less “lumpy” 
investments; (b) the possibility of achieving economies of scale in manufacturing to 
outweigh the smaller economies of scale in power generation; (c) the possibility of siting 
flexibility (arising from the potential for reduced water demands, potentially increased 
inherent safety, and possibly smaller areas for evacuation planning); (d) possible 
reductions in construction times (even shippability); (e) the possibility of recycling 
existing sites; and (f) avoiding the risk of having too much of a region’s electricity 
dependent on a single power plant. 
Finally, the group of U.S. and E.U. experts agreed on the high uncertainty characterizing 
future nuclear deployment. Less than 20% of the experts, in both groups, considered 
likely (>66%) the medium scenario (defined as 286 GW of nuclear energy both in the 
United States and in the European Union by 2050), which is the one that had the largest 
probability after averaging across all experts. The other scenarios were a scenario that 
represented no growth of nuclear power in the two geographies by 2050, and a high-
growth scenario that represented 400 and 477 GW installed in the European Union and in 
the United States, respectively, by 2050.  When presented with results from integrated 
assessment models of climate change and potential responses that included scenarios in 
which nuclear power deployments might grow to 5-10 times their current level by 2050, 
the experts generally took the view that growth on that scale was technically feasible, but 
there was disagreement over whether it was realistic given political and regulatory 
barriers. 
Some of the experts argued that sustaining a much larger nuclear enterprise for many 
decades would require recycling to extend uranium resources, while others argued that 
uranium supply would not be a major constraint for an extended period.  Some experts 
argued recycling would also have waste management advantages, while others argued 
these were not large enough to be decisive.  In addition, in the surveys, experts expressed 
their concern about the limited progress in working out long-term nuclear waste disposal 
options. A majority of U.S. and of E.U. experts thought that a successful repository siting 
in the United States would increase significantly the rate of construction of nuclear plants 
in their region.  During the workshop, experts reemphasized the importance of progress 
in both near-term and long-term approaches to safe management of spent fuel and nuclear 
waste, particularly in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident. 
   6
    
 
 
Figure ES-1: Gen III/III+ overnight capital costs estimates of U.S. (top panel) and E.U. (bottom 
panel) experts in 2030. The vertical line spans the 10
th to the 90
th percentile estimate.  The red line 
with the circle indicates the range of Gen III/III+ costs in 2010.  The blue line with the square 
indicates the costs under a business-as-usual level of government RD&D funding in 2030.  The green 
line with the triangle indicates the range of SMR costs in 2030 under the recommended RD&D 
budget of the experts who thought public RD&D would affect Gen III/III+ costs in 2030. The 
Advanced Fuel Cycle (AFC) estimate (shown as the blue band) can be found in: Shropshire, D.E., 
Williams, K.A., Boore, W.B., Smith, J.D., Dixon, B.W., Dunzik-Gougar, M., Adams, R.D., Gombert, 
D., Schneider, E. 2009. “Advanced Fuel Cycle Cost Basis.”  Technical Report from the Idaho 
National Laboratory. Document INL/EXT-07-12107. Available at: 
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/product.biblio.jsp?query_id=1&page=0&osti_id=983353. 
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Background and Objectives 
The future role of nuclear energy is a key factor in determining a long-term energy strategy to 
cope with the challenges ahead: a growing planet with a growing thirst for energy; providing 
universal access to modern sources of energy; assuring energy security and availability at 
reasonable costs; the threat of climate change, which calls for a drastic shift from current energy 
generation technologies; and the myriad other local, regional, and global environmental impacts 
of energy use and production. 
To play a major role in meeting these intertwined energy challenges, nuclear energy would have 
to grow dramatically, requiring strong support from governments, utilities, and publics around the 
world.  Achieving that support is likely to require improved economics and major progress 
toward resolving issues of nuclear safety, nuclear security, proliferation-resistance, and nuclear 
waste management.  To sustain a much larger nuclear enterprise for many decades may also raise 
the question of uranium availability and options for extending fuel resources. 
The objective of the workshop was to present the main results of an expert elicitation survey that 
was conducted both in the United States and in the European Union during the summer/fall of 
2010 to a set of worldwide known experts and to enable a discussion.  In this workshop the 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Harvard University teams presented and discussed the 
results of the U.S. and E.U. elicitations, with a particular focus on research, development, and 
demonstration (RD&D) needs, international cooperation, future costs and performance, and 
deployment scenarios in an effort to understand where there is consensus and where the most 
important disputes and uncertainties lie.   
The workshop also included a discussion of the factors that are likely to shape the diffusion of 
nuclear energy technologies beyond RD&D.  This topic was also covered by the survey and was 
the focus of the second day of the workshop. 
 
 
     8
1. Impact  of  Fukushima 
Highlights 
 
•  Experts largely agreed that it was too early to fully understand what impact Fukushima would 
have and what lessons should be drawn. 
•  Prior to Fukushima, both U.S. and E.U. experts had predicted that an accident or terrorist attack 
leading to a “major radioactive release” would lead to 50-100% reductions in future construction 
of nuclear reactors in their regions. 
•  At the workshop, there was a split view about whether Fukushima counted as the sort of “major 
radioactive release” they had envisioned, with some experts arguing that the event was far less 
than a Chernobyl-scale release. 
•  Experts at the workshop expected the accident’s impact on future nuclear deployment would 
vary by country: 
      - Possibly limited impact in India, China, and Russia 
      - Diverse impact in Europe and in “newcomer” states 
      - Projected construction in the United States is already modest 
•  Experts disagreed on the likely impact of the accident on relicensing of older reactors. 
•  Lessons learned: 
      - Need for analysis of “beyond-design basis” events 
      - Need for review of emergency plans 
      - Need for approaches to management of spent fuel that will not lead to fuel melting or fires if       
spent fuel pools lose their cooling mechanism, and need for long-term management 
approaches to be put in place 
      - Importance of understanding and addressing public concerns 
      - Need to ensure robustness of electricity supply even when reactors are shut down for an      
        extended period 
      - Need to evaluate vulnerability of concentrated reactor siting 
•  Impact on recommended RD&D 
      - Few experts revised their pre-Fukushima RD&D recommendations  
      - Areas of increased future focus identified in the discussion included: 
           o  Hydrogen management and control 
           o  Risk assessment and management 
           o  Responding to “beyond design basis” events 
           o  Future systems that could survive the most severe accident scenarios without major              
  releases 
           o  Approaches to spent fuel management (short- and long-term) 
•  Several experts pointed out that an important difference between Gen III and Gen III+ designs 
was more passive safety measures in the Gen III+ systems, which can last for longer without 
power. 
•  But there was general agreement that none of the Gen III/III+ designs could withstand station 
blackout lasting for many days without operator action. 
•  The experts agreed that it was important to put nuclear risks in the context of risks from 
alternative energy technologies. 
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1.1 Survey Findings 
This session began by posing a series of questions about the likely impact of the accident at 
Fukushima, and a presentation of E.U. and U.S. experts’ pre-Fukushima survey responses on the 
likelihood and impact of major radioactive releases resulting from accidents or sabotage of 
nuclear plants (see Appendix A for a list of the workshop participants and Appendices B and C 
for a list of the survey participants).  European and American responses to these questions in the 
survey were almost identical.  Both groups of experts overwhelmingly thought that an accident or 
sabotage leading to a major radioactive release was very unlikely (<10%) between 2010 and 2030, 
and that if it did occur, it would reduce the rate of new construction of nuclear power plants in 
their region by 50-100% compared to what would have occurred without the accident.  (The 
survey did not include a question on how much deployment outside the experts’ own region 
would be reduced.)  See Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2. 
 
Figure 1-1: Probability of a major radioactive release due to an accident or sabotage between 2010 
and 2030. 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Impact of safety incident between 2010 and 2030 on the growth of nuclear power in the 
European Union and the United States. 
 
Part of the focus of this session of the workshop was on how, if at all, the Fukushima accident 
should change approaches to RD&D for the future of nuclear energy.  As shown in Appendix D, 
before the accident,  both E.U. and U.S. experts recommended dramatic increases in government 
RD&D spending on nuclear power.  The mode recommendation for annual government funding 
for nuclear RD&D was around $1.2 billion for U.S. experts, and $2 billion for E.U. experts.  E.U. 
experts allocated on average 9% of their total budget for risk and safety research, and U.S. 
experts allocated 7% of their total budget to this category.  The experts participating in the 
workshop were given the opportunity to modify their previous RD&D recommendations based on 
the Fukushima accident and the discussion at the workshop; few chose to do so, though, as 
discussed below, in the discussion the participants identified several safety-related areas as 
deserving of additional work. 
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1.2 Summary of Workshop Discussion  
In the discussion, the experts disagreed as to whether Fukushima represented the kind of “major 
radioactive release” they were thinking of when they answered the survey.  Some argued that 
given the large amounts of radioactive iodine and cesium that had been released, Fukushima 
should be considered a major radioactive release, and what they had considered unlikely to occur 
during 2010-2030 had in fact occurred.  Others argued that the Fukushima release was much 
smaller than Chernobyl, and much smaller than the kind of release they had been thinking of 
when completing the survey.  One expert went so far as to argue that the fact that such an extreme 
natural disaster, which killed more than 20,000 people, had led to such modest nuclear 
consequences might actually increase public confidence in nuclear energy in the long run. 
While there was general agreement that it was too early to make detailed predictions of the 
impact of Fukushima, or to understand all of the lessons that should be learned, the participants 
nevertheless agreed that the impacts would be substantial, and drew a number of broad 
conclusions.  First, they agreed that nuclear power was likely to continue to grow in some 
countries, but that other countries might cancel or reduce their plans.  The experts generally 
expected that countries committed to large nuclear construction programs, such as China, India, 
and Russia, would likely continue those programs.  In Europe, the impact in some countries (such 
as Germany) might be substantial, while other countries might proceed with only modest impacts 
on the scale and pace of planned construction.  In the United States, little near-term reactor 
construction was expected even before the accident, for economic reasons (including low natural 
gas prices and the absence of a carbon price).  The experts expected that the impact on 
“newcomer” countries building their first nuclear reactor would vary from one country to the next, 
with highly committed countries such as the UAE continuing and others possibly delaying or 
canceling plans.  
One issue that will have as large an effect on how much nuclear energy is generated over the next 
few decades as the rate of new construction is relicensing beyond the originally licensed lifetimes 
of current reactors.  (Ironically, Unit 1 at Fukushima had only recently received a license 
extension, and would have reached the end of its originally licensed 40-year life a few weeks 
after the earthquake.)  One expert argued strongly that after Fukushima, it was time to take 
another look at whether relicensing of many older reactors lacking the most modern safety 
features made sense.  Others argued that relicensing should go forward, and that regulators should 
not and would not allow unsafe reactors to operate, whether they were reaching the end of their 
licenses or not. 
Second, beyond the impacts on future nuclear energy growth, the participants identified a few 
areas where the global nuclear industry should draw lessons and potentially modify approaches: 
▪  Better analysis of potential “beyond design basis”
1 events, and strengthened abilities to 
respond to them. 
▪  More effective emergency response plans (and more regulatory review of these plans). 
▪  Safer management of spent fuel, and in particular avoiding approaches that allowed pools to 
become so filled with “hot” fuel that fuel could melt or catch fire if the pools lost their 
cooling mechanism. 
▪  New steps to rebuild public confidence, including both steps to reduce the actual risks of 
nuclear energy and steps to better understand and address public fears and concerns. 
▪  Improved analysis and approaches to ensure robust electricity supplies even when some 
reactors are shut down for an extended period. 
▪  Improved analysis of the potential dangers of concentrating reactors very close together at a 
single site, as at Fukushima. 
                                                      
1 These are events are those that were not considered in the design of a reactor.   11
Third, the participants discussed how the Fukushima accident might affect the optimal size and 
focus of nuclear RD&D.  Few experts modified their earlier RD&D recommendations. 
Nevertheless, in the discussion, the participants identified a number of areas for increased 
emphasis, including: 
▪  Hydrogen management and control 
▪  Risk assessment and management 
▪  Responding to “beyond design basis” events 
▪  Future systems that could survive the most severe accident scenarios without major releases 
▪  Approaches to spent fuel management (short- and long-term) 
The participants also discussed how the features of new reactor designs would affect their ability 
to cope with situations like those that arose at Fukushima.  Several experts pointed out that an 
important difference between Gen III and Gen III+ designs was that the Gen III+ designs 
incorporate more passive safety measures, which can maintain cooling for a longer period without 
power.  One participant pointed out that the Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor 
(ESBWR) design is intended to be able to rely entirely on passive cooling, without needing power, 
for up to 72 hours.  But there was general agreement that none of the Gen III/III+ designs could 
withstand station blackout lasting for many days, as occurred at Fukushima, without operator 
action to maintain cooling. 
Finally, given that the earthquake and tsunami in Japan killed more than 20,000 people, and the 
reactor accident has so far not led to any deaths, the participants agreed that it was important to 
put nuclear risks in the context of other risks society faces, and particularly the risks from 
alternative energy technologies, including: 
▪  Hydropower dam vulnerabilities 
▪  Coal mining and emissions 
▪  Oil spills 
 
2.  Generation III/III+ Power Plants 
Highlights 
 
▪  Experts’ projected range of overnight capital costs of Gen III/III+ plants in both the European 
Union and the United States fall between $2,000/kW and $8,000/kW in 2030. Median projections 
for 2030 fall mainly in the $3000/kW-$6,000/kW range.  
▪  At the workshop, experts provided several reasons for the overnight capital cost escalation in 
the United States and the European Union  between 2003 and 2010: 
   – Difference between “who is paying”/contract structure 
   – Escalation of materials costs (a factor of two to five) 
   – Increased safety requirements 
   – Liberalization of electricity markets, which affects the cost of money 
▪  Over half of the experts expected that Gen III/III+ costs in 2030 would be as high as or higher 
than they were in 2010. 
▪  Since the Gen III/III+ plants are already developed, both U.S. and E.U. experts expect that 
additional RD&D will only lead to modest reductions, if any, in the costs of Gen III/III+ plants, 
although a number of experts projected some noticeable reduction from RD&D at their 
recommended budget levels.    12
2.1 Survey Findings  
This session began with the presentation of E.U. and U.S. experts’ projections of overnight 
capital costs for Generation III/III+ reactors in 2010, in 2030 under a business-as-usual (BAU) 
funding scenario, and in 2030 under experts’ recommended funding scenario (Figure 2-1). The 
blue band in the figures represents the high, low, and best guess estimate of the “Advanced Fuel 
Cycle Cost Basis” report
2 (AFC), provided as a reference point.  Experts’ projected range of costs 
in both the European Union and the United States generally fall between $2,000/kW and 
$8,000/kW.  50
th percentile projections for 2030 fall mainly in the $3,000/kW-$6,000/kW range.  
Numerous experts projected cost increases between 2010 and 2030 under a BAU funding 
scenario; however, two U.S. and two E.U. experts thought that their budget recommendation 
would reduce this price increase.   Over 40% of E.U. experts thought costs would increase from 
2010 to 2030 under BAU funding, and an equal percentage thought that costs would decrease. 
About 12% thought costs would stay the same.  Half of U.S. experts thought costs would increase, 
while 33% thought costs would decrease, and 17% thought they would stay the same between 
2010 and 2030 under BAU funding.   
 
    
 
Figure 2-1: Gen III/III+ overnight capital costs estimates of U.S. (top panel) and E.U. (bottom panel) 
experts in 2030. The vertical line spans the 10
th to the 90
th percentile estimate.  The red line with the 
circle indicates the range of Gen III/III+ costs in 2010.  The blue line with the square indicates the 
costs under a business-as-usual level of government RD&D funding in 2030.  The green line with the 
triangle indicates the range of SMR costs in 2030 under the recommended RD&D budget of the 
experts who thought public RD&D would affect Gen III/III+ costs in 2030.  The blue band marks the 
AFC estimate. 
 
In Figure 2-1, the absence of a 2030 estimate under recommended funding levels means that 
experts did not think government spending on nuclear energy RD&D would change Gen III/III+ 
                                                      
2 Shropshire, D.E., Williams, K.A., Boore, W.B., Smith, J.D., Dixon, B.W., Dunzik-Gougar, M., Adams, R.D., 
Gombert, D., Schneider, E. 2009. “Advanced Fuel Cycle Cost Basis.”  Technical Report from the Idaho National 
Laboratory. Document INL/EXT-07-12107. Available at: 
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/product.biblio.jsp?query_id=1&page=0&osti_id=983353.  
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costs in 2030.  Seven experts from the European Union and six experts from the United States did 
include estimates for Gen III/III+ costs under an enhanced RD&D budget. 
2.2 Summary of Workshop Discussion 
The discussion following the presentation of the above results centered on the reasons for the cost 
escalation between 2010 and 2030 (as well as the cost escalations that had already occurred by 
2010).  Experts cited as possible reasons: (1) the dependence on “who is paying,” or the contract 
structure; (2) the escalation of materials costs by a factor of between two and five; (3) the 
increased safety requirements associated with earlier cost increases; and (4) the liberalization of 
electricity markets affecting the cost of capital.  Experts noted that China is an exception where 
costs are moderate and made the observation that nth-of-a-kind plant overnight capital costs may 
be lower than first-of-a-kind plant costs.  When given the chance to revise their GenIII/III+ 
overnight capital cost projections, one U.S. expert and one E.U. expert revised theirs upwards, 
while one E.U. expert revised his downwards. 
 
3.  Generation IV Nuclear Plants 
Highlights 
 
▪  E.U. experts appear in general less optimistic about the costs of Gen IV designs in 2030 and 
about when Gen IV plants will be commercially available. 
▪  U.S. experts diversified their recommended RD&D budget across a wider range of Gen IV 
reactors, while E.U. experts emphasized sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs). 
▪  U.S. experts tend to focus on demonstration, while E.U. experts still see a large  need for 
further basic and applied R&D. 
▪  Among U.S. experts, consensus is less clear that more RD&D spending would lower the cost of 
Gen IV reactors. 
▪  In general the biggest projected effect of expanded RD&D is in cutting the tail of very high 
costs, and U.S. experts are less optimistic about that. 
3.1 Survey Findings 
In the survey conducted ahead of the workshop, experts were asked to project the cost and 
performance of Generation IV systems under several RD&D funding scenarios. Results of the 
survey indicate that, given current public and private RD&D funding, most E.U. experts are 
pessimistic regarding the commercial viability of Gen IV nuclear facilities in 2030, while U.S. 
experts are slightly more optimistic. For both groups, sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs) and 
very-high-temperature reactors (VHTRs) are the Gen IV systems mostly likely to be 
commercially available by 2030.  
When assessing the time frame when the 1 GWe Gen IV power plant or system will first become 
commercially available under the RD&D scenario each expert proposed in the survey, U.S. 
experts are in general slightly more optimistic about timing, while E.U. experts appear to 
converge around the year 2040 (see Figure 3-2). At the workshop experts agreed that E.U. experts 
may have converged around 2040 as a commercialization date because that is when projects in 
the E.U. plan for the SFR to be commercialized.  A small number of experts thought that none of 
the Gen IV reactors would be commercially viable for many decades. 
   14
 
Figure 3-1: Generation IV nuclear facilities that will be commercially viable by 2030 while 
addressing the Generation IV goals. Sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR); Very-high-temperature 
reactor (VHTR); Gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR); Supercritical-water-cooled reactor (SCWR). 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Time when Generation IV nuclear plant or system will first become commercially 
available under the R&D scenario proposed by expert. 
 
If we look at the allocation of the recommended budget, it is noticeable how E.U. experts (on the 
top in Figure 3-3) focus more on a single design (SFR), while the distribution across designs is 
less skewed in the case of U.S. experts. The two categories also differ in the type of RD&D 
recommended, as pilots and demonstration take the largest share in the U.S. case, while basic and 
applied R&D, at least in the case of SFR designs, is prevalent according to E.U. experts.  
Figure 3-4 reports 2030 Gen IV cost projections for both groups.  It shows that there are 10 out of 
23 U.S. experts and 4 out of 22 E.U. experts that have a median cost expectation in 2030 at or 
under $4,000 kW under the BAU RD&D scenario.  Uncertainty ranges are generally large.  On 
average, the differences between the 10
th and the 50
th percentiles and the 10
th and the 90
th 
percentiles are 30% and 44% of the 50
th percentile for the E.U. and U.S. cases, respectively. 
On the effectiveness of RD&D funding of Gen IV designs, there is again a divide in U.S. and E.U. 
perspectives. E.U. experts see a key role of RD&D in cutting the right tail of the cost distribution 
and U.S. experts can be clustered in two subgroups: one subgroup includes those that are 
skeptical of any role for RD&D, and the other subgroup is fairly optimistic about the role of 
RD&D in lowering the cost of Gen IV, even below those of Gen III/III+. 
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Figure 3-3: Minimum (always zero) Average and maximum recommended RD&D budget allocation 
on Fast Rectors systems over the next 10 years (top panel for U.S. experts, bottom panel for E.U. 
experts). Basic: basic research; Applied: applied research; Exp Pilots: experiments and pilots; and C 
Demo: commercial demonstration. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Gen IV overnight capital costs estimates of U.S. (top panel) and E.U. (bottom panel) 
experts in 2030. The vertical line spans the 10
th to the 90
th percentile estimate.  The blue line with the 
square indicates the expected cost in 2030 under the BAU RD&D funding scenario.  The green line 
with the triangle indicates the expected cost under the recommended RD&D funding scenario. The 
blue band marks the AFC estimate. 
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3.2 Summary of Workshop Discussion 
Experts agreed that Gen IV reactors face a challenging target in competing with Gen III/III+ 
LWRs in terms of cost and that it is extremely important to clarify that some Gen IV reactors are 
not only for electricity production but also for hydrogen and/or process heat production, and that 
others are able to dramatically extend uranium resources through recycling.  In addition, experts 
see part of the benefit of RD&D investments in Gen IV reactors in improving the technology 
along important criteria other than cost, for example safety, proliferation resistance and by simply 
providing a new technology for diversification of options.  Experts also thought it necessary to 
clarify the main reasons for pursuing particular Gen IV designs before setting RD&D 
priorities.There was a wide agreement across experts on the role of government in providing 
options for the future by funding demonstrations that the private sector will not invest in.  
Previous studies of SFRs found irreducible cost overheads due to the intermediary secondary 
cooling system.  Some experts argued that lead-cooled reactors could, in principle, overcome this 
extra cost.   
 
4.  Small Modular Factory-built Reactors (SMRs) 
Highlights 
 
▪ It is important to differentiate between different types of SMRs and the need for government 
support.  While the fundamental R&D on LWR-based SMRs is done, there is value in providing 
support towards licensing. Non-LWR-based SMRs need more RD&D support. 
▪  U.S. and E.U. experts differed somewhat on the commercial market for SMRs.  While U.S. 
experts were split, E.U. experts did not foresee a large market.  Consequently, U.S. experts placed 
more emphasis on public funding for SMR RD&D. 
▪  The majority of U.S. and E.U. experts expected SMR overnight capital costs ranging from 
$2,000 to $7,000/kW, although some experts expected costs above the $8,000/kW range.  
▪  The majority of E.U. and U.S. experts expect SMRs to be more expensive than Gen III/III+ 
reactors in 2030, although public RD&D increases the fraction of experts that think that SMRs 
will be less expensive. 
▪  Cost is not the only metric that should be used to evaluate SMRs.  They have other potential 
advantages over larger nuclear units: 
    – They require less “lumpy” capital investments 
    – It may be possible to achieve economies of scale in manufacturing to outweigh the smaller 
economies of scale in power generation 
    – They provide siting flexibility (e.g., they require less water) 
    – They could reduce construction times (even be shippable) 
    – They would enable the possibility of recycling existing sites 
    – They could contribute to avoidinging the “single-shaft risk”  
    – In the discussion there was little focus on possible safety and nonproliferation benefits 
▪  U.S. experts placed more emphasis on the need for the government to support SMR 
demonstrations and licensing than E.U. experts. 
▪  Government support is expected to decrease SMR costs in 2030 by between 5 and 20%   17
4.1 Survey Findings  
In the survey conducted ahead of the workshop, experts were asked to evaluate the overnight 
capital cost of small modular factory-built reactors (with capacities up to 300 MWe) in 2030 
under current federal nuclear RD&D funding and increased levels of funding.  The results shown 
in Figure 4-1 indicate that, while there is a concentration of answers of U.S. and E.U. experts 
between $2,000-$7,000/kW, there are wide variations across experts.  An E.U. and a U.S. expert 
estimated a 10
th percentile estimate as low as $1,000/kW.  In terms of 90
th percentile estimates, 
the two most pessimistic E.U. experts estimated 90
th percentiles as high as $16,000/kW, while the 
two most pessimistic 90
th percentile estimates from U.S. experts were $14,000/kW and 
$15,000/kW. 
 
Both on average, and also in terms of maximum recommended RD&D funding levels by an 
individual expert, U.S. experts recommended greater amounts of federal nuclear RD&D 
investment for SMRs than E.U. experts (Figure 4-2).  Indeed, while over half of U.S. experts 
recommended SMRs as one of their top four areas to invest (sixteen out of 30 experts), only 27% 
of E.U. experts (or eight out of 29) had SMRs as one of the top four areas to invest RD&D.  The 
emphasis of U.S. experts on basic research on SMRs compared to E.U. experts is due to their 
focus on Gen IV (not LWR) SMR designs.  Just as in the funding allocations for Gen  IV reactor 
research, U.S. experts also allocated relatively more funds for experiments and pilots, and 
commercial demonstration of SMRs than E.U. experts.  U.S. experts also allocated (on average) 
significantly larger funds for basic research on SMRs. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Overnight capital costs estimates of U.S. (top panel) and E.U. (bottom panel) experts in 
2030 for SMRs.  The vertical line spans the 10
th to the 90
th percentile estimate.  The blue line with the 
square indicates the range of SMR costs under a business-as-usual level of government RD&D 
funding.  The green line with the triangle indicates the range of SMR costs under each expert’s 
recommended nuclear RD&D funding. 
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Figure 4-2: Minimum (always zero), average and maximum recommended RD&D budget allocation 
on SMRs over the next 10 years (left panel for U.S. experts, right panel for E.U. experts). Basic: basic 
research; Applied: applied research; Exp Pilots: experiments and pilots; and C Demo: commercial 
demonstration. 
 
Over three-quarters of both U.S. and E.U. experts thought that SMRs would be more expensive 
than Gen III/III+ reactors in 2030 under a BAU RD&D funding.  Under the recommended 
RD&D scenario, about 40% of U.S. experts expect SMRs to become competitive with Gen 
III/III+ reactors.  However, it is worth emphasizing that there are several other possible 
advantages of SMRs when compared to Gen III/III+ reactors besides overnight capital cost.  This 
comparison is only made for reference purposes.    
Overall, the experts’ recommended RD&D investments (which ranged from $1 to $3 billion per 
year for nuclear RD&D), were expected to result in 5% to 20% reductions in the capital cost of 
SMRs in 2030 over the costs under a BAU RD&D funding scenario. 
 
Table 4-1: Experts opinions on the RD&D thrusts of public support programs for SMRs. The 
number of experts holding each opinion is noted in parenthesis. 
U.S. experts  E.U. experts 
 Demonstration of the economic viability of 
such designs (10) 
 Safety testing (including computer codes used 
in the regulatory process) (10) 
 NRC design certification and licensing process 
(9)  
 Factory fabrication methods (6) 
 Demonstration reactor (3) 
 Fuels and materials testing (3) 
 Spent fuel transport (2) 
 Proliferation resistance (2)  
 Reducing operating and maintenance costs 
 Integral PWR in-service-inspection and -testing 
capabilities 
 Multimodule advance control room design with 
reduced operator staffing 
 Generic SMR cost model  
 Passive safety 
 Early site licenses for process heat applications 
 Fuel, materials, and core behavior in long-term 
refueling (20 year) cycles (4) 
 Confirmation of claims related to economy of 
SMR (e.g., construction time, factory 
fabrication) (4) 
 Proliferation resistance (3)  
 Compact steam generators, internal control rod 
drive mechanisms (3) 
 Demonstration reactor and proof of operability 
(2) 
 Decreasing O&M costs 
 Integral testing, system and component 
qualification 
 Impact of modularity on fuel-cycle economics  
 Internationalization of regulatory process 
 Innovative designs (designs very close to 
conventional PWR technology do not require 
much RD&D) 
 Safety and management issues associated with 
locations close to public conurbations 
 
E.U. experts are more pessimistic about reductions under their recommended budget, clustering 
around reductions of 0-10% over the BAU RD&D estimates.  In contrast, most U.S. experts 
expect SMR cost reductions ranging from 0-30% under their recommended budget.  E.U. and U.S.   19
experts both expect that a RD&D budget ten times greater than what they had recommended 
would lead to significant SMR cost reductions. 
As expected by their greater RD&D allocation on demonstrations of SMRs, most U.S. experts 
recommending significant support for SMRs recommended carrying out demonstrations to 
evaluate the economic viability of SMR designs.  U.S. experts also placed a greater emphasis on 
the need for the U.S. government to support the licensing and certification process (Table 4-1).   
Both E.U. and U.S. experts emphasized the need to support factory fabrication methods to 
evaluate whether the decreased economies of scale on the reactor could be compensated with 
increased economies of scale in manufacturing.  Non-proliferation and safety were other 
important areas of focus for RD&D support. 
4.2 Summary of Workshop Discussion  
U.S. and E.U. experts differed somewhat on the commercial market for SMRs.  While U.S. 
experts were split, between those who thought that there were significant markets (in some cases 
niche markets) for SMRs, and others who thought the reductions in economies of scale in the 
reactor would lead to costs that are too high.  By and large, E.U. experts did not foresee a large 
market for SMRs.   
Experts also emphasized the fact that cost is not the only metric that should be used to evaluate 
SMRs.  SMRs have other potential advantages over larger nuclear units.  First, SMRs require less 
“lumpy” capital investments than 1 GWe or 700 MWe units.  Given the perceived risks in siting a 
nuclear plant, partly due to negative public perceptions and to long construction and siting 
processes, putting a significantly lower amount of capital “at risk” could be a significant 
advantage for investors.  Second, modularization and improvements in the fabrication process 
could result in significant economies of scale in manufacturing.  Third, SMRs is that they could 
increase siting flexibility, since some sites may not have sufficient water (or other) resources to 
support a full-scale nuclear plant but may be able to host a smaller one.  Fourth, factory 
fabrication could also reduce construction times, which is an important factor contributing to high 
nuclear costs.  In addition, SMRs may even be shippable, which would also reduce construction 
costs.  Fifth, some experts pointed out that in the United States there are several relatively small 
old coal plants with very low efficiency that may be replaceable with small (but not large) nuclear 
reactors.  This could create the possibility of recycling existing sites.  And the sixth and final 
possible advantage of SMRs discussed was that they could avoid the “single-shaft risk.”  Today, 
nuclear capacity factors are very high, but when a 1 GWe plant is down, the grid has to deal with 
a very large capacity loss (essentially this means that there has to be extra generation capacity 
able to compensate for this scenario).  Having several small units could decrease the probability 
that the grid will have to deal with very large imbalances. 
In spite of efforts to bring the topic to the table, there was little discussion on possible safety and 
nonproliferation benefits of SMRs. 
Experts also noted that it is important to differentiate between different types of SMRs and the 
need for government support.  While the fundamental R&D on LWR-based SMRs is done, there 
is value in providing support towards licensing. Non-LWR-based SMRs need more RD&D 
support. 
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5.  The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Highlights 
 
▪  U.S. experts placed more emphasis on fuel cycle R&D and on economics than E.U. experts. 
▪  Some U.S. experts highlighted the lack of a clear strategy for U.S. fuel cycle RD&D. 
▪  There was disagreement on uranium availability and the value of reprocessing for 
sustainability. 
▪  There were different views on whether non-aqueous recycling technologies count as 
“reprocessing” and their risks. 
▪  There was disagreement on the value of reprocessing for waste management and its impact on 
public acceptance. 
▪  There was agreement on the need to focus increased attention on establishing viable pathways 
for long-term disposal. 
5.1 Survey Findings  
In the survey conducted ahead of the workshop, experts were asked to allocate their 
recommended nuclear RD&D budget across a range of areas, including the fuel cycle.  A greater 
fraction of U.S. experts, 70% (21 out of 30 experts), when compared to 62% of E.U. experts (18 
out of 29) had fuel cycle as one of the top four areas for allocating nuclear RD&D funding. 
As shown in Figure 5-1, U.S. experts were more likely to have fuel cycle as one of their top areas 
for investment.   Those E.U. experts that recommended RD&D on fuel cycle only recommended 
between 7% and 15% of their budget to that topic, while those U.S. experts that recommended 
funding on fuel cycle recommended between 9% and 32% (the distribution of U.S. answers is 
highly skewed to high fractions of total investments).  
 
 
Figure 5-1: Percentage of recommended nuclear RD&D budget devoted to fuel cycle [%]. 
 
U.S. and E.U. experts also differed in the RD&D thrusts of fuel cycle research.  While the most 
common thrust mentioned by U.S. experts was improving the economics, E.U. experts 
emphasized waste minimization and recycling—an area that U.S. experts also focused on.  The 
separation of minor actinides was also an RD&D thrust with a lot of support from both E.U. and 
U.S. experts.  Waste disposal was another research area perceived to be important by the experts. 
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Table 5-1: Experts’ opinions on the RD&D thrusts of public support programs for fuel cycle. The 
number of experts holding each opinion is noted in parenthesis. 
U.S. experts  E.U. experts 
  Improving economics (6) 
  Separation chemistry of minor actinides (5) 
  Waste minimization, spent fuel recycling 
(4) 
  Improving proliferation resistance (2) 
  Interim storage and geologic disposal (2) 
  Pyroprocessing 
  Transuranic burnup in fast reactors 
  Blanket process for breeders 
 
  Waste minimization, spent fuel recycling 
(6) 
  Partitioning technologies to separate, 
recycle, and burn minor actinides (4) 
  HLW repositories, spent fuel geologic 
disposal (2) 
  Pyroprocessing 
  Carbide and nitride fuels 
  Electrochemical refining of metal fuel 
  Proliferation and safety 
  Optimization of radioactive waste 
5.2 Summary of Workshop Discussion  
As already discussed, U.S. experts placed more emphasis on fuel cycle research than E.U. experts.  
They also placed more emphasis on research that would demonstrate or disprove that the 
economics of particular fuel cycle approaches are favorable.  
In the discussion of the future direction of fuel cycle research, some U.S. experts highlighted the 
lack of a clear strategy for U.S. fuel cycle RD&D.  They indicated that this was a real problem 
that could lead to an inefficient use of funds. 
The value of reprocessing to increase the sustainability of the uranium resource (to make sure the 
world does not run out of economically viable uranium) was an area of debate.  Experts disagreed 
about whether it would be necessary to recover plutonium and uranium from spent fuel within the 
next half-century to ensure that nuclear power has enough uranium fuel globally.  
Experts also disagreed about whether non-aqueous recycling technologies count as “reprocessing” 
and their risks.  One participant argued that since non-aqueous technologies such as 
pyroprocessing would not separate pure plutonium from which nuclear weapons could be made, it 
posed significantly lower proliferation risks and should not be considered reprocessing.  Another 
participant noted that studies in the United States had concluded that there was little difference in 
proliferation risk between pyroprocessing and traditional aqueous reprocessing technologies, and 
that the U.S. government had determined that pyroprocessing should be considered “reprocessing” 
as that term is used in limiting exports under U.S. law.  
The last area of disagreement was whether reprocessing had advantages from a waste 
management perspective.  In particular, some experts felt that reprocessing did not result in 
significantly smaller requirements for geologic disposal, while others asserted that there were 
benefits to be gained.  Several experts expressed the view that the public does not see 
reprocessing as a way to solve the waste management question, which implies that public 
acceptance would not necessarily increase from a push for reprocessing.   
There was one area in which all experts agreed, however, this was the need to focus attention on 
long-term disposal.  Achieving success in siting, licensing, and operating long-term disposal sites 
would be a very important step forward for nuclear energy. 
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6. International  Cooperation 
Highlights 
 
▪  Most experts agree that to pursue innovation in an efficient manner it will be necessary to select 
a subset of technologies that are judged to be ahead of others and to reorganize internationally 
harmonized efforts and investments on applied research, pilots, and demonstrations.  
▪  E.U. experts tend to see greater advantages in collaborative projects on basic and applied 
research, establishing an E.U. governance to foster the dynamics of knowledge and technology 
transfer. 
▪  U.S. experts are more concerned with international collaboration on demonstration for 
Generation IV technologies, sharing costs and results with countries like China, Japan, and South 
Korea. 
6.1 Survey Findings  
Interrogated on the usefulness of international cooperation, both E.U. and U.S. experts agree on 
the importance of establishing active partnerships with other countries (Figure 6-1). 
The Fukushima accident revived the international debate on the importance of defining common 
cross-boundary regulation systems and standards on nuclear plants.  Although the main purpose 
of an effective international cooperation remains the design and enforcement of safety rules 
related to the global effects of a nuclear accident, several other crucial advantages from 
cooperation, mainly linked with cost sharing and knowledge transfer, arose from the surveys of 
both E.U. and U.S. experts.  
 
Figure 6-1: Experts willing to spend some of the RD&D funds they recommended in collaborative 
projects with other countries. 
 
Most experts agree that to pursue innovation in an efficient manner, it will be necessary, 
sometime between 2020 and 2030, to select a subset of technologies that are judged to be ahead 
of others and to reorganize internationally harmonized efforts and investments on applied 
research, pilots, and demonstrations.   Pursuing RD&D on all types of reactors does not seem to 
be feasible, given time and resource constraints.  Most experts suggested focusing on relatively 
mature Generation IV technologies, particularly SFR and VHTR systems.  
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Figure 6-2: Main areas of cooperation selected by the E.U. and U.S. experts (each expert could select 
more than one area). 
 
Regarding RD&D expenditures, E.U. experts tend to see higher advantages in collaborative 
projects on basic and applied research (Figure 6-2). They suggest that all E.U. countries with 
active nuclear programs should aim at establishing an E.U. governance to foster the dynamics of 
knowledge and technology transfer. R&D should mainly focus on Gen IV technologies, to share 
the research advancements on innovative materials and nuclear fuel, and on safety and waste 
management technologies. E.U. experts recommend establishing international consortia on basic 
and applied research with technologically advanced countries like the United States and Japan. 
They stressed the necessity of exploiting bilateral or multilateral partnerships with Korea, Japan, 
Russia, China, and India on joint construction and operation of large experimental facilities, and 
on new design features for demonstrators (Figure 6-3). 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Country partners for nuclear RD&D recommended by the E.U. experts (top) and the 
U.S. experts (bottom). 
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There are several reasons why experts thought international cooperation in nuclear RD&D should 
be supported. U.S. experts recognized the need of a joint research effort on Gen IV reactors, 
especially with France and Japan. They are particularly supportive of international collaboration 
on demonstration of Gen IV technologies (Figure 6-2).One of the main reasons for this is the lack 
or scarcity of experimental facilities in the United States. According to the experts, much of U.S. 
experimental infrastructures in the nuclear area have been lost. The new systems will require 
irradiation facilities and other means of testing, and other countries, especially China, Japan and 
South Korea, have been very active in building new capabilities (Figure 6-3).  
All experts pointed to the fact that international demonstrations are useful to share the results and 
the high costs.  U.S. experts also felt that collaboration with other countries is critical because 
nuclear power is becoming more global in nature, and the United States should be an active part 
of new international arrangements.  Experts from the United States and the European Union 
thought that multilateral cooperation could contribute to more transparent non-proliferation 
verification. 
Finally, both E.U. and U.S. experts are aware of the existing hurdles to effective international 
cooperation, which are generally a lack of common commitments and objectives, and could 
therefore be overcome through the definition of a single international authority. 
6.2 Summary of Workshop Discussion  
E.U. and U.S. experts underlined the importance of establishing common programs and 
objectives at the international level. During the workshop session they mainly emphasized the 
difficulty in creating productive collaborative efforts, mainly because most international 
cooperation is currently driven by the need to support national objectives.  
The experts described a few positive examples of international cooperation: the Superphénix 
project (run by the NERSA consortium, a joint company of EdF, France, ENEL, Italy and SBK, 
Germany), the collaboration between CEA and Slovenia, and the international cooperative effort 
on safety in LWRs in the 1970s and 1980s. According to the experts, establishing a country lead 
ensured the success of the above cited cases.  
The experts did not acknowledge a sufficient effort toward international cooperation on Gen IV 
reactors. They considered the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) mostly as an information 
exchange platform, and they recognized that France and Japan are still split on leading SFRs. 
Since few E.U. experts had recommended collaborating with the U.S. on demonstration activities, 
U.S. experts considered the possible barriers to cooperation due to difficulties in licensing. 
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7. Financial  Barriers and Other Factors Affecting the Growth of Nuclear 
Power 
Highlights 
 
•  U.S. and E.U. experts largely agree that licensing and construction delays, costs overruns, and 
insufficient government support result in an increased risk premium for nuclear power facilities 
over natural gas. 
•  Most E.U. and U.S. experts are convinced that in the short term the risk premium on nuclear 
investments will remain higher than the natural gas plant discount rate, but in the long term there 
will be a progressive decrease in the importance of non-technical factors on the  risk premium for 
nuclear investments.  
•  Global events like nuclear accidents, major costs overruns, and proliferation from the civilian 
nuclear energy system could cause a significant decrease in the rate of construction of new 
nuclear power plants in the E.U. and in the U.S. 
•  Successful siting and demonstration projects, and failures in the use of fossil fuel and 
renewable energy technologies would have a positive effect on the deployment of nuclear power. 
7.1 Survey Findings  
E.U. and U.S. experts were asked to assess the role of non-technical non-cost factors, which are 
not likely to be affected by RD&D programs, in constraining the deployment of nuclear power in 
the European Union and in the United States by 2030. Five specific conditions were selected 
which could contribute to a risk premium for nuclear power facilities greater than for natural gas 
power plants. The natural gas power plant discount rate assumed was 10%. Risk premium is the 
financial return in excess of the risk-free rate that a riskier investment is expected to yield.  It is 
also known as the weighted average cost of capital. It is expressed as a certain percentage point, 
B%, rate increase over the risk-free rate (A%).  
U.S. and E.U. experts largely agree that delays, overruns, and insufficient government support 
result in an increased risk premium over natural gas. U.S. and E.U. experts are split about 
whether “low availability of financing” results in a risk premium over natural gas plants. Most 
E.U. experts think that “safety and security” affects the risk premium, while U.S. experts are split 
(Figure 7-1). 
Most E.U. and U.S. experts are convinced that in the short term (around 2010 or the present time), 
there is a large element written into investment risk evaluation for non-technical factors (i.e., 
public perception) (Figure 7-2). As time goes on, governments could be forced, for practical 
purposes, to expand nuclear generation, and the majority of the public would become more or less 
indifferent to the issues currently surrounding nuclear power. According to most experts, this 
element will contribute to a partial, but progressive, decrease in the importance of non-technical 
factors on risk premium for nuclear investments. The process will not be linear, but faster in the 
early years, mainly between 2020 and 2030.   26
 
Figure 7-1: Impact on risk premium due to the selected non-technical factors. 
 
Both E.U. and U.S. experts agreed that major radioactivity releases caused by an accident or 
sabotage could decrease by 50-100% the rate of construction of new nuclear power plants in the 
European Union and in the United States, in the 20 years after the event takes place (Table 7-1), 
although they consider these events very unlikely to happen before 2030 (Table 7-2).  Both E.U. 
and U.S. experts recognize the serious impact of major costs overruns, which could lead to a 
reduction of 10-50% in the development of nuclear plants. The experts are split concerning the 
likelihood of such an event. Proliferation from the civilian nuclear energy system, although 
unlikely to take place (especially according to U.S. experts) is the third crucial factor of risk, 
which could decrease by 10-50% the rate of nuclear plant construction.  
While U.S. experts highlighted the positive effects of a successful repository siting in the United 
States, which would lead to an increase in the deployment of nuclear plants by 10-100%, E.U. 
experts also recognized the important role of an international repository siting, which would also 
increase the deployment of nuclear plants in the next 20 years (Tables 7-1 and 7-2). 
The experts indicated a few other events that would positively affect the rate of nuclear power 
plant construction by 2030 (Table 7-3). Both E.U. and U.S. experts considered the effects of 
major problems in the electricity grid possible due to the use of alternative energy sources. 
According to most experts, the deployment of nuclear power plants would benefit from the 
successful operation of new nuclear plants. The inclusion of nuclear energy into long-term 
national policy, and the enforcement of a carbon policy would also push the development and 
diffusion of nuclear.  
Successful demonstration projects on a large scale would highlight the benefits of nuclear 
deployment, and this process would receive positive feedback effects in the event of large coal 
slurry or oil spills.  On the other hand, E.U. experts recognised the crucial role of public 
perception and opinion in leading to the institutional acceptance of nuclear power as a key 
solution for future energy production.   27
 
 
Figure 7-2: Risk premium for nuclear investment above natural gas power plant discount rate 
according to U.S. experts (above) and E.U. experts (below) E.U. experts 12 and 13 are probably 
referring to the total risk premium.  
 
Table 7-1: Impact of global developments or events on nuclear power plant construction. 
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Table 7-2: Likelihood of global developments or events. 
 
 
Table 7-3: “Other” events that would affect nuclear power plant construction rates over the next 20 
years.  All events but the last row (in grey) would have a positive impact on construction.  
E.U. experts  U.S. experts 
▪  Repeated blackouts/brownouts 
▪  Major electricity grid failure due to incoherent 
grid loaning by alternative energy sources 
▪  Recurring power shortages/outages 
▪  New plant in operation within planned budget  ▪  Successful construction, operation of several 
plants (U.S., outside U.S., Gen IV) 
▪  Strong government policy support that nuclear 
is part of the long-term energy mix 
▪  Widespread adoption of a carbon tax (U.S. 
>$10/ton CO2) 
▪  Increase of fossil fuel price 
▪  Major increase in competition for oil with other 
countries (like China) 
▪  Demonstration of nuclear deployment benefit to 
economy 
▪  Materialization of total nuclear disarmament 
(Obama’s speech, Prague, 6 April, 2009) 
▪  Successful partitioning and transmutation 
demonstration on a large scale 
▪  Largest coal slurry spill or oil spill in history 
▪  Stronger anti-nuclear movements   
7.2 Summary of Workshop Discussion  
The workshop discussion confirmed the survey finding that licensing and construction delays, 
cost overruns, and insufficient government support contribute to an increased risk premium for 
nuclear power facilities over natural gas.  Over time, experts expect that, as more facilities get off 
the ground, the risk premium for nuclear investments will decrease. 
Beyond the financial risk premium, experts raised several factors that could contribute to an 
acceleration or deceleration of the construction of nuclear power plants in the United States and 
the European Union.  Experts highlighted that nuclear accidents (such as the one in Fukushima or 
larger) or proliferation from the civilian nuclear energy system could lead to significant decreases 
in the rate of construction of nuclear power plants.  In contrast, accidents or cost overruns in the 
development and use of fossil sources and renewables could accelerate nuclear plans.  Similarly, 
the siting of long term waste repositories and the successful on-budget completion of nuclear 
demonstration projects could improve the prospects for nuclear power. 
 
<10% 10-50% 50-90% >90%
US
Major Cost overruns 1 13 7 5
Major radioactivity release due to accident or sabotage 21 3 2 0
Successful U.S. repository siting 6 10 10 0
Successful international repository siting 0 3 14 9
Proliferation from civilian nuclear energy system 14 12 0 0
EU
Major Cost overruns 1 12 12 3
Major radioactivity release due to accident or sabotage 22 4 1 1
Successful U.S. repository siting 2 13 11 2
Successful international repository siting 0 4 10 14
Proliferation from civilian nuclear energy system 17 8 3 0
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Successful U.S. repository siting 2 13 11 2
Successful international repository siting 0 4 10 14
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8.  Diffusion of Nuclear Power 
Highlights 
 
▪  17% of E.U. and 13% of U.S. experts considered “likely” (>66%) the medium scenario of 
nuclear growth to 2050. U.S. (E.U.) experts attach greater (smaller) weight to the tails, as 7% 
(3%) and 3% (0%) of them consider “likely” the low and high scenarios, respectively. 
▪  Most of the participating experts believed that scaling up nuclear deployment to very high 
levels would be feasible over the long term.  Others argued that a variety of political and 
regulatory contraints made such huge growth highly unlikely. 
▪  The experts generally agreed that improved reactor and fuel-cycle technologies could help 
achieve such high levels of nuclear growth while minimizing safety, security, and proliferation 
risks and waste management challenges. 
▪  Some experts argued that fueling such high levels of nuclear growth would require recycling to 
extend uranium resources, while others argued that sufficient uranium would be available to fuel 
a once-through cycle for many decades to come. 
▪  For many experts the diffusion of nuclear technology factors beyond technology will be critical 
(e.g., public acceptance, government support for licensing and financing, etc.). 
 
8.1 Survey Findings  
Experts were asked to estimate the probability of three scenarios (low, medium, and high) for the 
growth of nuclear power in 2050 in both the United States and the European Union.
3  The low 
scenario is defined as the current E.U./ U.S. nuclear power capacity maintained to 2050; in the 
medium scenario an expansion of up to 286 GW in both E.U. and U.S. nuclear capacity is 
assumed; in the high scenario the expansion of EU/U.S. nuclear capacity in 2050 will reach 
400/477 GW, respectively.  
8.2 Summary of Workshop Discussion  
During the workshop experts were shown nuclear deployment numbers taken from the Energy 
Modeling Forum 22 (EMF 22) study database (Figure 8-1)
4.  Published in late 2009, it includes 
modeling results from a large number of different groups around the world.  The study examined 
a wide range of cases. CO2 constraints were varied from business-as-usual (no constraint) to 
atmospheric concentration as low as 550 ppm CO2 equivalent (moderate climate policy) and 450 
ppm CO2 equivalent (stringent climate policy) (Figure 8-2). 
Projected nuclear penetration dramatically depends on what policies are assumed to be in place. 
In particular, climate policies could trigger larger rates of nuclear deployment throughout the 
world. The deployment of nuclear in a fast growing country under a stringent climate policy 
could be critical in determining its cost, hence the importance of country participation to an 
international climate agreement. Integrated assessment models produce very divergent projections 
for these fast-growing countries, primarily because they have different assumptions about the 
extent to which governments in different fast growing economies (mainly China) will rely on 
nuclear power to meet their growing electricity demand. 
                                                      
3 At least two experts claimed they had in mind climate change when assessing the likelihood of diffusion 
scenarios 
4 Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Krey, V., Richels, R., Rose, S., Tavoni, M., “International climate policy 
architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios”, Energy Economics 31 (2009) S64.   30
 
 
Figure 8-1: Nuclear Projections EMF 22 Study: Global Capacity Installed. The units are GW. The 
continuous projections represent the average across ten EU/U.S. models under different policy 
scenarios.  The two dots represent IAEA projections for 2030.
5  Installed capacity in 2010 is not 
exactly the same in different models because for some of the models the data for 2010 is simulated, 
and not historic. 
 
 
Figure 8-2: Nuclear Projections EMF 22 Study: Capacity Installed. The units are GW.  The 
continuous projections represent the average across ten EU/U.S. models under different policy 
scenarios in the United States (on the left panel), and in the European Union (on the right panel). 
Markers represent the low, medium, and high scenarios evaluated by experts. 
 
In discussing these figures: 
▪  Most of the participating experts believed that scaling up nuclear deployment to such levels 
would be feasible over the long term.  Others argued that a variety of political and regulatory 
contraints made such huge growth highly unlikely. 
▪  The experts generally agreed that improved reactor and fuel-cycle technologies could help 
achieve such high levels of nuclear growth while minimizing safety, security, and 
proliferation risks and waste management challenges. 
▪  Some experts argued that fueling such high levels of nuclear growth would require recycling 
to extend uranium resources, while others argued that sufficient uranium would be available 
to fuel a once-through cycle for many decades to come. 
▪  For many experts the diffusion of nuclear technology factors beyond technology will be 
critical (e.g., public acceptance, government support for licensing and financing, etc.). 
 
                                                      
5 IAEA. 2009. “Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2030.” 2009 Edition. 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Viena, Austria. Available at:  http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/RDS1-29_web.pdf 
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Nomenclature 
 
Acronym  Description 
BAU Business-as-usual 
CEA  Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (Atomic Energy Commission) 
EdF Électricité  de  France 
ENEL  Ente Nazionale per l’Energia eLettrica 
EMF  Energy Modeling Forum 
Gen IV  Generation IV reactors are innovative reactors that will enable 
nuclear energy to meet the energy needs of the future while also 
complying with the concept of sustainable development, in 
particular relating to more efficient use of uranium and optimized 
management of nuclear waste 
GFR  Gas-cooled fast reactor (Gen IV) 
HLW  High level waste 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
LFR  Lead-cooled fast reactor 
LWR  Light water reactor 
NERSA  Nuclear European Reactor SA 
PWR  Pressurized water reactor 
RD&D  Research, development & demonstration 
SBK Schnell-Brüter-Kernkraftwerksgesellschaft  mbH 
SCWR  Supercritical-water-cooled reactor (Gen IV) 
SFR  Sodium-cooled fast reactor (Gen IV) 
SMR  Small modular factory-built reactors (<300 MWe, or MW 
electric) 
VHTR  Very-high-temperature reactor (Gen IV) 
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Appendix  
A. List of E.U. and U.S. nuclear experts participating in the Workshop 
 
Joonhong Ahn  
Berkeley University, US  
 
Laura Diaz Anadon  
Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, US  
 
Fosco Bianchi  
Italian National Agency for New 
Technologies (ENEA), Italy  
 
Valentina Bosetti  
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy  
 
Matthew Bunn  
Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, US  
 
Michela Catenacci  
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy  
 
Allan Duncan  
Euratom, UK  
 
Dominique Finon  
Centre national de la Recherche Scientifique, 
and Centre International de Recherche sur 
l’Environnement et le Developpement, 
France  
 
Kevin Hesketh  
National Nuclear Laboratory, UK  
 
Christian Kirchsteiger  
European Commission, Directorate-general 
Energy 
Luxembourg  
 
Andrew Klein  
Oregon State University, US  
 
Audrey Lee  
Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, US  
 
 
William Nuttall  
University of Cambridge, UK  
 
Enn Realo  
University of Tartu, Institute of Physics, 
Estonia  
Pradip Saha  
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, US  
  
David Shropshire  
European Commission Joint Research 
Centre, The Netherlands  
 
Craig Smith  
Naval Postgraduate School, US 
 
Finis Southworth 
AREVA, North America, US 
 
Renzo Tavoni 
Italian National Agency for New 
Technologies (ENEA), Italy  
 
Harri Tuomisto 
Fortum Power, Finland 
 
Andrej Trkov 
Institute Jozef Stefan, Slovenjia 
 
Edward Wallace 
NuScale, US 
 
Bob van der Zwaan 
Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands, 
The Netherlands 
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B. List of E.U. nuclear experts participating in the survey 
 
Name  Previous and/or current affiliation  Country 
Markku Anttila  VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland)  Finland 
Fosco Bianchi  Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and sustainable 
economic development (ENEA)  Italy 
Luigi Bruzzi  University of Bologna  Italy 
Franco Casali  Italian National agency for new technologies, Energy and sustainable 
economic development ENEA; IAEA; University of Bologna  Italy 
Jean-Marc 
Cavedon  Paul Scherrer Institut  Switzerland 
Didier De Bruyn  SCK CEN, the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre  Belgium 
Marc Deffrennes  European Commission, DG TREN, Euratom  Belgium 
Allan Duncan  Euratom, UK Atomic Energy Authority, HM Inspectorate of Pollution  UK 
Dominique Finon  Centre national de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre International 
de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Developpement (CIRED)  France 
Konstantin 
Foskolos  Paul Scherrer Institut  Switzerland 
Michael Fuetterer  Joint Research Centre - European Commission  The 
Netherlands 
Kevin Hesketh  UK National Nuclear Laboratory  UK 
Christian 
Kirchsteiger  European Commission, Directorate-general Energy  Luxembourg 
Peter Liska  Nuclear Power Plants Research Institute  Slovak 
Republic 
Bruno Merk  Institute of Safety Research 
Forschungszentrum Dresden-Rossendorf  Germany 
Julio Martins 
Montalvão e Silva  Instituto Tecnologico e Nuclear  Portugal 
Stefano Monti  Italian National agency for new technologies, Energy and sustainable 
economic development (ENEA)  Italy 
Francois Perchet  World Nuclear University  UK 
Enn Realo  Radiation Safety Department, Environmental Board, Estonia; University 
of Tartu  Estonia 
Hans-Holger 
Rogner  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  Austria 
David Shropshire  Joint Research Centre - European Commission  The 
Netherlands 
Simos Simopoulos  National Technical University of Athens; Greek Atomic Energy 
Commission, NTUA  Greece 
Renzo Tavoni  Italian National agency for new technologies, Energy and sustainable 
economic development (ENEA)  Italy 
Andrej Trkov  Institute Jozef Stefan  Slovenja 
Harri Tuomisto  Fortum Nuclear Services Oy  Finland 
Ioan Ursu  Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering 
(IFIN-HH)  Romania 
Bob van der Zwann  Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN)  The 
Netherlands 
Georges Van 
Goethem  European Commission, DG Research, Euratom  Belgium 
Simon Webster  European Commission, DG Energy, Euratom  Belgium 
William Nuttall   University of Cambridge   UK   34
C. List of U.S. nuclear experts participating in the survey 
 
Name  Previous and/or current affiliation 
 John F. Ahearne  National Academy of Sciences, Sigma Xi, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Johnhong Ahn  University of California, Berkeley 
Edward D. Arthur  Advanced Reactor Concepts, Los Alamos National Laboratory, University of New 
Mexico 
Sydney J. Ball  Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Ashok S. 
Bhatnagar 
Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Operations 
Robert J. Budnitz  Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Douglas M. Chapin   MPR Associates 
Michael L. 
Corradini 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
B. John Garrick  U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 
Michael W. Golay  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Eugene S. 
Grecheck 
Dominion Energy 
Pavel Hejzlar  TerraPower 
J. Stephen Herring  Idaho National Laboratory 
Thomas Isaacs  Stanford University, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Kazuyoshi Kataoka  Toshiba 
Andrew C. Klein  Oregon State University 
Milton Levenson  Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Bechtel, EPRI 
Regis Matzie  Westinghouse 
Andrew Orrell  Sandia National Laboratory 
Kenneth Lee 
Peddicord 
Texas A&M University 
Per F. Peterson  University of California, Berkeley 
Paul S. Pickard  Sandia National Laboratory 
Burton Richter  Stanford University, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Geoffrey Rothwell  Stanford University 
Pradip Saha  GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy 
Craig F. Smith  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Monterey Naval Postgraduate School 
Finis Southworth  AREVA, North America 
Temitope Taiwo  Argonne National Laboratory 
Neil E. Todreas  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Edward Wallace  NuScale, PBMR Ltd., Tennessee Valley Authority   35
D. Distribution of E.U. and U.S. experts’ budget recommendations for nuclear 
energy RD&D funding.   
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